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The State, Diaspora Policy and Immigrant Organizations – Lessons from the Polish Case

Abstract: This paper examines the relations between immigrant organizations and the institutions of their state of origin as well as the influence of those relations on situation of such organizations. It focuses specifically on the case of Poland over the period 1989-2015 in which significant changes with regards to diaspora policy were introduced. In other words, a shift from a model based on capacity building policies to a model focused on extracting obligations from the diaspora has taken place. These changes have had considerable impact on the role and capacity of Polish immigrant organizations as well as their relations with the Polish state.

Keywords: Diaspora policy, Polonia policy, immigrant organizations, migration

Introduction
Immigrant organizations – understood here as associations established by and for immigrants to provide social, economic and cultural services or those which represent and seek to advance communities¹ – often draw the attention of migration scholars.² Playing a central

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role with respect to immigrants\textsuperscript{3}, the country of residence and its society\textsuperscript{4}, along with the state of origin\textsuperscript{5} immigrant organizations seem to be an interesting example of partnership between the third sector and public administration. Relations between immigrant organizations and the institutions of both the host and the sending state certainly have an influence on their position. In scholarly discourse this influence has usually been described and explained with the use of the concept of political opportunity structure.\textsuperscript{6} However, in the wealth of literature concerning this problem, most studies concentrate on the opportunity structures that are created and provided by the state of origin. Much less attention is paid to the problem of how the country of origin is influencing the immigrant organizations.\textsuperscript{7}

We argue that one of the main tools of such influence is diaspora policy, understood here as “the state institutions and practices that apply to those members of that state’s society who reside outside its borders”.\textsuperscript{8} Although diaspora policies developed by countries are highly differentiated\textsuperscript{9}, Gamlen\textsuperscript{10} proposes a useful typology that helps to categorize the types of actions engaging diaspora with the sending state:

capacity building policies – aimed at creating among heterogeneous diaspora communities a homogenous state-centric national identity;

- extending rights to the diaspora – in the process of extending the sovereignty of the home-state over diaspora it is important to grant a kind of membership/citizenship to diaspora members;

- extracting obligations from the diaspora – based on the belief that that emigrants owe loyalty to their homeland.

Although the literature on diaspora policy seems to be growing in recent years\textsuperscript{11}, the problem of how diaspora policy is shaping relations between public administration of the country of origin and the immigrant organizations representing their diasporas, and in consequence influencing their position is rather still underdeveloped. The country of origin is usually interested in having some sort of influence on the organizations that bring together its emigrants, perceiving them as a potential asset that can provide it with support in the form of humanitarian and development aid\textsuperscript{12} or as a partner in public diplomacy.\textsuperscript{13} Countries of origin may support organizations in their pursuit of goals that are consistent with the state’s policies and objectives. Such states may also seek to restrict the organizations’ operating freedom and, in some cases, even attempt to shut them down.\textsuperscript{14} Also, earlier studies show that the execution of diaspora policy may influence the financial standing of immigrant organizations.\textsuperscript{15} Therefore, the aim of this article is to fill in this gap by describing how diaspora policy and its changes influence the position of immigrant organiza-


\textsuperscript{12} Pries and Sezgin, op. cit., p. 1.


\textsuperscript{14} Sardinha, op. cit., p. 88.

tions. As a case study, the example of Poland and Polish immigrant organizations (PIOs) is used.

The example of Poland seems to be particularly interesting in the context of the new intra-European migration flows that are among the largest that Europe has seen since 2004 and which have had impact on the demographic and economic situations in both the countries of origin and residence. Although the mass influx of refugees into Europe has dominated public and academic debate, it is notable that migrations by the citizens of the new EU member states have been among the largest that Europe has seen in the last decade. The new intra-European migration flows and the resulting upsurge of diasporas have called into question the migration and diaspora policies of the Central and Eastern European countries of origin. Poland, in contrast to the majority of CEE countries, has a long-standing tradition of pursuing a diaspora policy, which it has traditionally referred to as the “Polonia policy” (polityka polonijna). The substantial rise in migration streams originating in Poland, mainly to other EU member states, has significantly affected Poland’s policy on the diaspora. Those transformations gained considerable momentum between the years 2011-2015 when a whole “new diaspora policy” had emerged.

We argue that the transformations of Polish diaspora policy toward a “new Polonia policy” has changed the conditions and role of Polish immigrant organizations (PIOs) – as seen from the perspec-
tive of policymakers – and as a consequence affected their relations with the Polish state.

1. Research findings

1.1. Data

This article presents the outcomes of research built on a model comprised of two key components. It begins by reviewing the planning and implementing documents associated with the Polonia policy, as monitored by the authors of this article since 2010. The authors have also examined a number of other key documents related to this field which date back to 1991, the year in which the diaspora policy of the Polish state first began to emerge in the wake of systemic transformations. All publicly available planning and implementing documents associated with the Polonia policy that had been developed by Polish state institutions were analyzed. The research approach applied by authors was based on the content analysis research method. This enabled tracking the evolution of diaspora policy over the span of 25 years. Secondly, the article makes use of the findings of an empirical study conducted by the authors between 2015 and 2017 among 25 representatives of institutions and organizations participating in the formulation and implementation of Polish diaspora policy. This part of the research relied on the technique of individual in-depth interviews (based on an interview guide composed of open-ended questions) to provide insights into the way the so-called institutional agents perceive ongoing processes and their impact on PIOs. The study extended to representatives of a wide range of institutions involved in creating and implementing diaspora policy, including governmental institutions, both chambers of the Polish parliament, Polish non-governmental organizations as well as research organizations providing their expertise. The applied sampling technique was purposive sampling – the authors chose in-

19 The study forms part of the research project “Polish immigrant organizations in Europe” scheduled to be carried out by the Centre of Migration Studies, University of Warsaw, Poland in 2017-2018 (previously conducted the Institute for Western Affairs, Poznań, Poland in 2015-2016). The project is financed by the Kraków based National Center for Science as a follow up to the funding scheme SONATA BIS (no. 2014/14/E/HS6/00731).

stitution perceived by them as major in the system of Polish diaspora policy and attempted to reach the representatives that might provide expertise due to their positions in each organization. The interviews were recorded and transcribed. The applied analytical approach was based on Anselm Strauss’s and Juliet Corbin’s classical scheme of content analysis. The content analysis was conducted by the authors and led to creating a map of categories.

1.2. Towards “new diaspora policy” – the analysis of strategic documents
The Polish diaspora policy was developed anew after the democratic breakthrough of 1989. Although Polonia policy was often criticized for a lack of continuity and coherence because of multiple transformations, we argue that since 1989 there were generally two main paradigms shaping the strategic documents organizing Polish diaspora policy. The first ruling between the years 1980-2010 will be called here “old diaspora policy”, the other – ongoing during the years 2011-2015 will be called “new diaspora policy”.

1.3. The “old diaspora policy”
The first strategic document projecting Polonia policy after systemic change in 1989 was “The Objectives and Priorities of the Government’s Policy on Polonia, Emigration and Poles Living Abroad”, and was included in an annex to the Governmental Act 145/91 of November 5, 1991 on collaboration with the diaspora, emigrants and Poles living abroad. The document stated that “maintaining and developing multifaceted relationships between the home state and the diaspora shall be the responsibility of the entire nation and shall be pursued by the state administration, non-governmental organizations as well

24 Fiń et al., *Polityka polonijna*. 
as members of migrants’ family members and professional and other communities”.

Although the tenets of Polish diaspora policy were further cosmetically modified with the formulation of “The governmental program of collaboration with the Polonia and Poles living abroad” in 2002 and its extension in 2007, it was “The Objectives and Priorities of the Government’s Policy on Polonia, Emigration and Poles Living Abroad” that set diaspora policy priorities for years to come. One of its premises was to make a clear distinction between the two diasporas of Poles living in the west (western, democratic countries like Germany, UK, USA, etc.) and Poles living in the east (in former USSR countries like Latvia, Belarus, Ukraine, Kazakhstan). The former were seen as a potential source of support for both Poles in the east and the Polish state in the systemic and economic transition. The latter were to be given special care and assistance. This had a significant consequence for PIO’s because the need to support the organizations of Poles living in western countries was long overlooked as such organizations were seen as wealthy and self-sufficient. This had the potential effect of thwarting their institutional development.

In general the analysis of the strategic documents projecting the “old diaspora policy” shows that this period can be characterized, using Gamlen’s typology, as a capacity building policies with some kind of modified extending rights to the diaspora. The Polish state focused on supporting its diaspora and providing assistance, as well as sustaining Polish national identity and the diaspora’s bond with Polish culture. All of that was justified by the value-based rhetoric of the obligation of the Polish state towards its diaspora – especially in the East. This care often took a form of financial support for PIOs delivered by the Senate, the upper chamber of the Polish parliament, and distributed


27 The situation when a legislative institution is engaged in the execution of public policy is non-standard. This case results from the time of Polish system transformation between 1989-1991,
mostly through a few Polish non-governmental organizations dedicated to helping its diaspora.28 Yet this support was also focused on PIOs dealing mostly with Polish national identity, culture and language.

1.4. The “new diaspora policy”
The year 2011 brought about a serious paradigm change. Interestingly enough, contrary to its predecessors, the “new diaspora policy” relied largely on short-term planning and specific measures. This is because despite all its prior attempts, it was not until 2015 that the government managed to adopt and implement a new strategic document. The year 2011 saw the release of a draft governmental program for collaboration with the Polonia and Poles living abroad29, which was supposed to be adopted in 2013. Although some of its objectives were later pursued, the program itself was never brought into force.

A pivotal document that defined the new role of diaspora policy in Poland’s foreign policy was “The Priorities of Poland’s foreign policy in 2012-2016”30 adopted by the Council of Ministers in March 2012. The document defined the new diaspora strategy as: “a partnership-based collaboration with the diaspora and Poles living abroad leading to the understanding of and effective backing for Poland’s national interests and Polish foreign policy and to harnessing the capacities of the diaspora and Poles living abroad for the promotion and building of Poland’s positive image worldwide”.31 In 2014, further changes to the precepts of diaspora policy were made in a draft governmental program of collaboration with the Polish diaspora for the years 2015-2020.32 The document itself enumerates the key challenges that shaped

when the Senate was the first body of government elected in an entirely democratic procedure. As a consequence, it was a partner desired by the diaspora itself due to its independence from the previous, socialist state.

28 The key organizations were the “Wspólnota Polska” Association (“The Polish Commonwealth”), “Semper Polonia” Foundation, and “Pomoc Polakom na Wschodzie” Foundation (“Support for Poles in the East”).


31 Ibid.

32 MFA of Poland, Projekt „Rządowego programu współpracy z polską diasporą w latach 2015-2020” [The project of the Government program of cooperation with the Polish diaspora and Poles abroad for
the proposed diaspora policy. Ultimately, in August 2015, the government adopted a new governmental program of collaboration with the Polonia and Poles living abroad for the years 2015-2020.\textsuperscript{33} Arguably, this Program can be described as conventional or even conservative rather than revolutionary. Compared to its earlier versions, it has significantly diluted its previous emphasis on the diaspora’s involvement in asserting Poland’s \textit{raison d’état}. This program can also be symbolically recognized as an end of the “new diaspora policy”.

The analysis of the strategic documents which determined the “new diaspora policy” reveals that its paradigm assumptions are close to Gamlen’s \textit{extracting obligations from the diaspora} as it was defined as an instrument of pursuing Poland’s national interests and policies with a particular focus on foreign policy. Although past programs have mentioned the diaspora’s support for Poland, never before has so much emphasis been placed on presenting the links between Poles living abroad and their homeland as an obligation. The “new diaspora policy” was based on an interest driven approach that saw the Polish state – Polonia relation as pragmatic and very closely connected with asserting Poland’s \textit{raison d’état}. This normative shift was accompanied by practical changes in 2012, the primary responsibility for financing diaspora policy and supporting Poles living abroad and their organizations moved from the Senate to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.\textsuperscript{34} Although seemingly a mere technicality, the shift significantly changed diaspora policy practice, mainly through new rules for awarding funds to institutions supporting the diaspora. The financing approach was two-pronged. On the one hand, Polish consulates in host countries held competitions for local PIO’s. With the subsequent approval of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, funds would be appropriated to winning projects. In parallel, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs itself held an open competition for Polish institutions and NGOs expected to submit projects for collaboration with the diaspora. From 2012 to

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\item \textsuperscript{33} MFA of Poland, \textit{Rządowy program współpracy z Polonią i Polakami za granicą w latach 2015-2020} [Government program of cooperation with the Polish diaspora and Poles abroad for 2015-2020], 2015, http://www.msz.gov.pl/resource/70a7021e-304c-4075-a812-18e5b3410966:JCR.
\item \textsuperscript{34} Both the shift of the diaspora policy budget from the Senate to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the way in which tenders were organized, came under criticism of some institutional agents and approval of the way.
\end{itemize}
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When analyzing the strategic documents that project the “new diaspora policy” it appears that although PIOs form a critical part of this paradigm (as they may join the competitions organized by consulates and are expected to partner with the Poland-based organizations that participate in the main competition held by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) their role is in fact highly limited. The “old diaspora policy” was more focused on PIOs that were perceived as an important facilitator between the Polish state and Polonia and a major tool of sustaining contact with Polish national identity, culture and language. The “new diaspora policy” saw more limitations of PIOs, that were regarded as weak and of limited social coverage (associating and representing a minor part of the diaspora). Hence, the need arose to create mechanisms for the engagement of those Poles living abroad who had been unwilling to get involved in the existing organizations in the past and had no intention of getting involved then.

2. Consequences of the “new diaspora policy” for PIOs

An examination of the in-depth interviews with the representatives of Polish institutions and NGOs involved in implementing diaspora policy has revealed that the shift from “old” to “new diaspora policy” had important implications for PIO’s in the opinion of the interviewees. A number of narratives in the examined discourse have been found to present the way in which the transformations of diaspora policy were to affect the condition of PIOs. The greatest emphasis was placed on the results of adopting the competition procedure to govern the spending of state funds on collaboration with the diaspora and Poles living abroad. This approach is interesting as eligibility to take part in such tenders was limited to Polish-based organizations. The various forms of impact achieved in this manner were indirect

35 The competition covering tasks to be carried out in 2016 was initiated by the MFA but completed by the Senate that has retrieved the leading role in executing the Polish diaspora policy in the end of 2015/ beginning of 2016.
and resulted from the fact that entities in Poland acted as facilitators in the delivery of services to diaspora communities. As a matter of fact, this formula initially left PIOs greatly befuddled:

_They were very confused about the competitions and didn’t quite understand how they worked, especially that, under the tender rules, bids had to come from Polish-based institutions or else the funding couldn’t be processed._ \(<R17>\)

The first framework for assessing the impact of changes in the way in which the state diaspora policy was to be implemented focused on the impact of the annual cycle of competitions and the need to “serve the diaspora” through projects, which was a consequence of the cyclical spending mechanism. As assessed by some of the respondents, even those representing governmental institutions, the competition procedure led to a discontinuity of activities carried out for the benefit of diaspora communities and created an uncertainty for the PIOs that relied on the services of the Polish-based entities selected in tenders:

_I think there are good reasons to keep the system alive although it does contribute to uncertainty and discontinuity in certain fields._ \(<R1>\)

In the view of some of the interviewees, the competition procedure created instability in the pursuit of the goals formulated in the planning documents. The competition results showed that the priorities to be achieved by the publically funded projects were frequently subject to an unpredictable interference that made little sense for the outside observer. As a consequence of this state of affairs, the efforts made with respect to PIOs were largely assessed as random and uncoordinated:

_No clear objectives were set, no defined indicators were established... you can write anything. [...] for – say – two years, the commission finds an idea or project fabulous. Being a practitioner I had my doubts, I thought the project was random, not that it was horrible but – given the whole range of diaspora needs... I wondered what made this one – of all projects – so good? Two years on, the project is gone, no one has any interest._ \(<R13>\)

The second assessment framework rested on the premise that diaspora policy and, in particular, the activities undertaken with respect to PIOs prior to 2012, when a large money envelope was placed under the management of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, were in need of profound reform. Some interviewees described prior institutional public spending practices and mechanisms as opaque and causing
PIOs to stagnate. Against this background, the modified diaspora policy precepts and new implementation instruments, and in particular the annual competition, were to help significantly advance PIOs. The changes launched in 2012 were seen as an incentive expected to fuel the growth of the PIOs that took part in such competitions and collaborated with various Polish-based entities:

You could see definite improvements from one year to the next – this was a huge benefit of having the competitions. They forced organizations not as much to abandon unreasonable expectations, because they haven’t... but at least to make adjustments and recognize they wouldn’t get money for nothing and that they had to try hard and find specific projects which they would get financed. […] This helped them grow. It also allowed them to find out what other organizations were doing and think of how to make better applications and submit bids that are better than others. <R11>

Finally, a discussion of the perception of the impacts of diaspora policy reform on the condition of PIOs would not be complete without touching upon another issue that was present throughout the discourse of the respondent institutions. This issue was the “ politicization of diaspora policy” which was said to be unaffected by the above developments. While such developments could be said to improve transparency and thereby reduce political influences, the respondents nevertheless saw the impact of current circumstances in the national political scene as having a major effect on the measures taken with respect to diaspora communities:

I would like the state policy on the Polish diaspora to be as free of politics as possible and be disjointed from the winning political party’s efforts to assert its power. Diaspora policy should transcend boundaries and differences. <R12>

All in all, the impact of this state of affairs on the condition of PIOs is a highly complex matter as, in view of many representatives of institutions, diaspora relations form a persistent part of the internal political game:

There is actually no diaspora policy as such – various political parties use the diaspora for various purposes... Due to its place in our electoral code and its role in the presidential and parliamentary elections, the diaspora may be in a position to tip the scales – it must be recognized for the powerful force it is. <R3>
The electoral schedule may therefore influence the standings of PIOs in line with the political preferences of the diasporas of specific countries, the current configuration of political forces in national politics and the extent of the political engagement of individual diplomatic posts.

Conclusions
The conducted study enabled the identification of how Polish diaspora policy design and implementation has changed over time. Primarily, changes can be seen in the nature of the relationship between the country of origin and the diaspora and the management practices of that relationship implemented by the former. These involve a shift of emphasis from the obligations of the Polish state towards the diaspora to the obligations of the diaspora towards their homeland and the benefits that Poland stands to derive from their fulfillment. In other words, the “old diaspora policy” that in Gamlen’s typology may be described as capacity building policies with some kind of modified extending rights to the diaspora, resulted in financial support for PIOs (mainly concentrated on issues related to national identity, culture and language) delivered by the Senate, and distributed mostly through a few Polish non-governmental organizations. However, the “new diaspora policy”, that according to Gamlen’s model is based on extracting obligations from the diaspora, introduced treating PIOs as assets useful for pursuing Poland’s national interests and policies with a particular focus on foreign policy. As a consequence, diaspora policy tasks have been increasingly delegated to the diaspora itself with assistance of a growing set of Polish NGOs.

Another objective found to be of critical importance for the achievement of the purposes of this paper was identifying the impact of the above-named changes on PIOs positions. The content analysis of the conducted individual in-depth interviews enabled drawing a picture of how sending country institutions’ representatives perceived that impact. The most pronounced reform outcomes are those pertaining to the adoption of tender procedures in awarding public funds and its impacts on the collaboration with the diaspora and Poles living abroad. Such an impact included the projectization of diaspora policies and the resulting discontinuity in relations with Polish com-
munities abroad as well as uncertainty experienced by the Polish immigrant organizations benefiting from the services delivered by the Polish-based NGOs chosen in tenders. Another consequence of the competition procedure lies in its failure to ensure consistency among diaspora policy objectives. The priorities set for publically financed projects were subject to frequent changes that came without warning and appeared arbitrary, possibly confusing the tenderers. On the other hand, the Polish diaspora policy reform was a response to the demands of the institutional actors that criticized the previously existing solutions. In their view, the modifications improved the condition of PIOs by forcing their members to become more active and improve the quality of the services they offered to broader diaspora communities, stimulating collaboration across various Polish-based organizations. Note also that the impact of changes in diaspora policy formulation on Polish immigrant organizations may in part have resulted from its politicization. This conclusion is supported by the respondents’ declared view that various players in the domestic political scene use Poland’s efforts towards the diaspora to achieve their immediate goals.

Transformations of this kind have the potential to further critically affect traditional Polish immigrant organizations which find themselves having to compete against one another, against other NGOs operating in Poland and against the so called migration industry defined as a “set of specialized social actors and commercial institutions that profit directly not only from human mobility but also from effective adaptation into the new environment.”36 Such unprecedented competition from other public actors (the welfare state)37 as well as private organizations (the migration industry) has been clearly affecting the position of PIOs. Due to their organizational practices, a lower


level of formality and lesser potential\textsuperscript{38}, many classical Polish immigrant organizations end up competing at a disadvantage.

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